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In the last 20 years, a reflexive turn has been announced in 
social science, involving the application of analytic 
approaches from the field of Science and Technology Studies 
to social science research itself:
Driven partly by a growing interest in knowledge production 
and partly by a desire to make the social sciences ‘fit-for-
purpose’ in the digital era, these studies seek to reinvigorate 
debates around methods by treating them as embedded social 
and cultural phenomena with their own distinctive biographical 
trajectories – or ‘social lives’. (Mair et al., 2013: 1)
The small body of work I examine in this article locates 
itself within this tradition, as involving ‘the application of 
sociology to sociological work’ (Greiffenhagen et al., 2011: 
abstract). However, a slightly more accurate characterisation 
would be ‘the application of ethnomethodology to sociologi-
cal work’. As such, it offers a useful opportunity to explore 
the relationship between ethnomethodology and mainstream 
social science.1
Of course, reflexive attention to social science practice has 
a lengthy history, in various forms. ‘Natural histories’ of par-
ticular research projects have long been produced, generating 
a huge literature (see Hammersley, 2002) – albeit one that 
seems to be largely neglected. And, in the 1960s, Alvin 
Gouldner (1970), Robert Friedrichs (1970) and others sought 
to develop a ‘sociology of sociology’. Meanwhile, in the 
1980s, anthropologists and others began to pay increasing 
attention to the role their work played in processes of imperi-
alism and social reproduction, especially through the ways in 
which they represented the people they studied in their writ-
ten accounts (Clifford and Marcus, 1986). And the discursive 
practices employed by other types of social scientist were 
also explored, including in sociology (Brown, 1977 [1989]; 
Edmondson, 1984) and in economics (McCloskey, 1982; 
Samuels, 1990).2 What is distinctive about the most recent 
reflexive turn is the particular analytic approaches that have 
been deployed, and the commitment on the part of some to 
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empirical investigation of colleagues’ research practices. Also 
significant is that, rather than reflexivity being deployed in 
order to inform social science practice, at face value at least 
this new approach (or set of approaches) is simply concerned 
with studying how social science operates in the realm of the 
very phenomena that it studies, its similarities to lay reason-
ing, and to forms of data collection and analysis that have 
somewhat different goals (e.g. that which serves companies’ 
needs for marketing information, or governments’ require-
ments for policymaking) (Savage, 2013). Furthermore, 
‘methods are increasingly being seen as productive or “per-
formative,” that is, as “enacting” the very societies, cultures 
and systems of exchange they offer accounts of [. . .]’ (Mair 
et al., 2013: 2).
In this article, I focus on a particular study in this tradi-
tion, one that draws on ethnomethodology (reported in 
Greiffenhagen et al., 2011, 2015; Mair et al., 2013, 2016). 
These authors investigated the work of two sets of research-
ers: a team of sociologists deploying qualitative analysis 
methods, and one of statisticians developing quantitative 
modelling procedures for social science colleagues. The 
authors present their work as an ethnomethodological inves-
tigation of social science, concerned with detailed documen-
tation of actual practice.
They describe the fieldwork involved in their study as 
follows:
Over the five months of the project (November 2009–March 
2010), we conducted several interviews with individual 
researchers from both units (17 with Realities, 10 with 
BIAS),3 attended workshops and talks (2 and 3), sat in on a 
variety of group meetings (12 and 2), and observed analysis 
sessions in which researchers worked on data together (3 
and 6). We also had a variety of different kinds of written 
accounts to work with as well (working papers, websites, 
official documentation and the like). While the analysis 
sessions provided our focus, our capacity to make sense of 
what was going on within them was directly informed by 
what we learned in these other ways. (Greiffenhagen et al., 
2011: 96)
In their first article, ‘From methodology to methodogra-
phy’, the authors begin from a common assumption within 
research methodology that qualitative and quantitative 
research ‘involve incompatible ways of reasoning about 
the social world’. They state that their aim is to study 
research methods in practice so as ‘to gain insight into how 
social scientists reasoned through their research problems 
and to assess the extent to which this aspect of their work 
could be broken down along qualitative or quantitative 
lines’. Presenting this work as joining ‘a growing body of 
research into “the social life of methods” (Law et al., 
2011)’, they highlight studies of the interactional achieve-
ment of survey interviews (e.g. Houtkoop-Steenstra, 2000; 
Maynard et al., 2002; Suchman and Jordan, 1990), but also 
investigations of the practices employed in qualitative 
interviews (e.g. Greiffenhagen et al., 2011: 94; Hester and 
Francis, 1994; Rapley, 2001: 94).
The authors then examine ‘two brief episodes taken from 
meetings’:
The first centres on two researchers involved in analysing and 
drawing conclusions from an interview transcript, the second 
centres on two researchers in the process of checking a statistical 
model built to combine temporal and spatial data at the small-
area level. (Greiffenhagen et al., 2011: 96)
In the first example, the qualitative researchers are examin-
ing some of their data about families and local relationships, 
and comment that what one informant says about his rela-
tionship with his neighbour does not match with the usual 
sociological understanding of community life. The authors 
summarise their analysis of this episode as follows:
what we see over the course of the four extracts is a glimpse of 
an analysis-in-the-making, the transformation of an odd 
comment in response to a question in an interview into one of 
the keystones of a sociological analysis of ‘associations in place’ 
through the alchemy of social scientific reasoning practices. 
(Greiffenhagen et al., 2011: 100)
The statisticians’ work was concerned with creating 
‘generic models able to capture the degree of local variation 
among small geographical areas over time, establishing both 
the common trend across areas as well as those areas which 
departed from or “bucked” that trend’ (Greiffenhagen et al., 
2011: 100). The focus of the discussion examined here was on 
what was taken by the statisticians to be a potential problem in 
one of the models they had developed; an asymmetry between 
the strands of the model dealing with the common trend and 
local variation. They are concerned with whether this
is simply a result of the statistical software they are using rather 
than technical, substantive or methodological decisions. The 
researchers start to think about possible ways to correct this 
asymmetry, but note that the most obvious ways of proceeding 
(i.e. introduce symmetry) would result in ‘quite a substantively 
different model’. (Greiffenhagen et al., 2011: 102)
The authors present these data as giving access to an ‘unfold-
ing history, a glimpse of the model-in-the-making’. They 
comment,
The end-products of statistical research are typically designed to 
stand-alone, to wear their logical structure on their sleeve, but 
here we are looking at something that is not a finished product; 
it is still a live issue. [. . .] Models do not build themselves any 
more than they interpret themselves; it is neither a predominantly 
mechanical nor purely deductive process. Of course, some 
standard techniques are involved; they are not starting from 
scratch. But choices still have to be made, and these are 
frequently based on intuitions, hunches and ideas of what is 
needed that have not yet been fully rationalized. The researchers 
are not following a pre-specified template, this is not the 
‘beginning of [. . .] rails invisibly laid to infinity’ (Wittgenstein, 
1953: §218) along which the modelling process glides without 
effort. (Greiffenhagen et al., 2011: 103)
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The authors conclude their discussion by summarising 
their aim as documenting:
‘the work that makes the methods work’, [. . .] the things that 
members have to do – as far as they are concerned – to adequately 
deploy their elected method, but which are not normally 
articulated as part of the explication of how the method is 
followed.
And, speaking to the issue of the distinction between qualita-
tive and quantitative research, with the former often described 
as ‘interpretative’ by contrast with the latter, they comment 
that ‘we can observe that the reasoning in which the research-
ers are engaged in both cases involves “interpretation”’. The 
authors do not deny the existence of differences in the rea-
soning deployed by the two groups of researchers, but they 
argue that
[. . .] the inferences the researchers made in the course of their 
exchanges began at different points, were leveraged in different 
ways and led them in very different directions because they 
belonged to distinct lines of inquiry into quite distinct problems 
each with their own local and disciplinary histories. Embedded 
in and addressed to distinctive ‘problem situations’, it was their 
differences that provided the researchers’ purchase on their 
particular problems and gave their research its character as 
research of a particular kind. It was these diffuse differences, 
and not a generic separation down qualitative and quantitative 
lines, that mattered to doing the work. (Greiffenhagen et al., 
2011: 104)
Finally, the authors insist that
There is no intention to match the practices of either group 
against anyone’s ideals of method so as to attribute 
methodological failings (or successes) to them. Acknowledging 
that these were specific moments in ongoing projects, what we 
have attempted to bring out is that the described practices are 
constitutive aspects of producing sound research for all practical 
social scientific purposes (cf. Anderson et al., 1985: 136). 
(Greiffenhagen et al., 2011: 104)
I will outline the other two substantive articles produced 
by these authors much more briefly, since they cover some 
of the same ground. In ‘Methodological troubles as prob-
lems and phenomena’, Greiffenhagen et al. (2015) focus 
on how the two sets of researchers dealt with ‘troubles’ 
that they encountered in the course of their analytic work, 
how these arose locally on particular occasions in this 
work, and how resolving them was part of ‘the practical 
accomplishment of method’ (p. 462). In ‘Statistical 
Practice: Putting Society on Display’ (Mair et al., 2016), 
the authors show how the statisticians relied on back-
ground knowledge about the social phenomena to which 
their data related, and sometimes engaged in sporadic 
investigation to check this, as well as orienting to whether 
their models would be found useful or how they would be 
used by social science colleagues.
Discussion
As a preliminary to examining this research, it is worth not-
ing that ethnomethodologists have often displayed an ambiva-
lent attitude towards conventional forms of social scientific 
work (see Hammersley, 2018: ch3). On one hand, they have 
sought to distinguish their approach as a radical alternative to 
it; and as part of this, they have often questioned its scientific 
credentials, primarily on the grounds that it trades on common 
sense assumptions rather than relying solely on technical 
methods and analytically grounded inferences, in the way that 
it has sometimes claimed to do. Moreover, ethnomethodologi-
cal work has often been put forward as a way of studying the 
social world that avoids this problem (see Zimmerman and 
Pollner, 1970). For example, Button et al. (2015: 13) write that
The social sciences feed off and, curiously, at the same time seek 
to rival common-sense, thereby producing a disjuncture between 
the social world as known and understood by social scientists 
and the social world as it is known and understood by society’s 
members. Ethnomethodology, by contrast, recognises that 
common-sense knowledge of social doings is the very bedrock 
of social life and makes it a topic of study in its own right.
These authors describe the social sciences as producing 
‘abstract and general descriptions that hover above social life 
as it is ordinarily encountered by the very people engaged 
in society’s day-to-day business’ (p6). And they echo 
Garfinkel’s suggestion that ‘the social sciences are “talking 
sciences” essentially occupied with the business of “shoving 
words around”’ (p144).’
On the other hand, Garfinkel (2002: ch2) often insisted 
that ethnomethodology is ‘incommensurable with, and 
asymmetrically alternate to’ conventional social science, 
rather than competitive with it. Indeed, he suggested that 
describing ‘professional and lay sociological practices’ is the 
main task of ethnomethodological investigation, as illus-
trated by his analysis of jurors’ deliberations and of coding 
practices carried out for research purposes (Garfinkel, 1967).
Greiffenhagen et al. explicitly locate their work in this 
second enterprise, and they abjure any criticism of the 
researchers they studied, even though they point to the ways 
in which those researchers drew on common sense under-
standings and practices. At the same time, they do hint at 
criticism of social research methodology. And while, in 
places, they could be interpreted as proposing methodogra-
phy as a supplement to methodology, the title of their first 
article, and some of their discussion there and elsewhere, 
suggests that they are proposing that methodography should 
displace methodology. The authors report that research on 
‘the social lives of methods’:
reflects dissatisfaction with programmatic doctrinal statements of 
the aims of the social sciences wedded to meta-reflection, critique 
and inter- and intra-disciplinary jostling and one-upmanship. 
Rather than using idealized conceptions of social science as 
decontextualized standards to judge what social scientists do, the 
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focus has been on understanding the scale, range and diversity of 
the social sciences’ practical entanglements in social and cultural 
life, showing that the social sciences do not merely record, but are 
productive, helping to bring into being and stabilize the very 
phenomena they depict [. . .]. (Greiffenhagen et al., 2015: 461)
At one point, without any clarification, the authors refer to 
‘the mythological conception of the methodology of the 
social sciences’ (Greiffenhagen et al., 2015: 480).
A first task in examining the intended status of their work 
must therefore be to identify the differences between metho-
dography and methodology. These appear to include the 
following:
1. Where methodology relies, at best, on researchers’ 
informal impressions of how they do their work, 
methodography involves detailed documentation of 
exactly what is done.
2. Methodography is not self-documentation but docu-
mentation of others’ practices.4
3. The descriptions produced take into account aspects 
of practice that would be overlooked as unimportant 
by methodologists.
4. Methodography’s concern is simply with describing 
social science practices, not with evaluating them or 
prescribing what researchers ought to do.
On the basis of this, it would seem that there are at least a 
couple of reasons for the authors’ questioning of conventional 
methodology. First, that most of it is not based on careful inves-
tigation of what researchers do, and therefore often has a 
remote or distorted relationship to their actual practice. This 
parallels criticism, from Science and Technology Studies (see, 
for instance, Law and Lodge, 1984), of philosophers’ assump-
tions about the work of natural scientists.5 The second argu-
ment is a deeper one, and more directly related to 
ethnomethodology. This is that the problem with methodology 
is that it makes generalisations about the practice of research, 
rather than taking account of its contextually constituted char-
acter. Furthermore, methodology formulates rules that are to be 
followed, thereby assuming that research can be reduced to for-
mal procedures that govern behaviour, rather than recognising 
that rules are invoked in situationally specific ways in the 
course of practice – in other words, that their character is per-
formative not representational. I will examine each of these 
arguments in turn.
The authors set up a contrast between a standard view of 
social science, characteristic of methodology, and that which 
is embedded in their own work and other investigations of 
‘the social life of methods’. They write that
Social science methods (fieldwork, interviewing, surveying, 
analysis, writing, etc.) are less and less being seen (or, at least, 
are less likely to be claimed to be seen) as discrete technical 
devices or armaments that enable those who deploy them to step 
outside the societies and cultures they study so as to view them 
objectively from afar. Instead, they are increasingly being 
treated as part-and-parcel of those societies and cultures, and 
constitutive elements of the knowledge-making practices that 
operate at their very centre.
Later, they label the view they are opposing as ‘positivistic 
conceptions of method’ (Mair et al., 2013: 1–2).
We can start by noting that the characterisation of social 
research methodology deployed here – as assuming that 
researchers can ‘step outside the societies and cultures they 
study’, and as requiring that they view societies ‘objectively 
from afar’ – is a significant misrepresentation. This account 
may have been true in the 1950s but it is certainly not true 
today. A great deal of the current methodological literature 
deals with qualitative approaches that are premised on the 
idea that researchers are part of what they study, and these 
approaches frequently reject the principle of objectivity, or 
fundamentally reinterpret it (see Hammersley, 2011: ch4). 
Nor does this literature generally assume that methods are 
‘discrete technical devices’. So, the social research method-
ology that is being rejected here is a caricature.6
We should also note that when Science and Technology 
Studies (STS) scholars criticised philosophy of science, 
much of the force of their criticism hinged on the fact that the 
philosophers were not, for the most part, themselves engaged 
in doing scientific work. But the situation is quite different 
with social research methodology; the literature dealing with 
this has been produced almost entirely by practising social 
scientists, and is often based on their experience in carrying 
out research. So, this objection to methodology presumably 
relies primarily on distrust of social researchers’ own infor-
mal knowledge of what they do. While I believe there can be 
grounds for this, at face value it stands somewhat at odds 
with ethnomethodology’s valorising of members’ practical 
understanding.
I will now turn to the second argument against method-
ology: that it makes general, and prescriptive, claims – rather 
than recognising the situated, reflexive character of all 
accounts, including those of social researchers. The argu-
ment here is that, rather than researchers following some 
template of good practice, they necessarily constitute what 
would be good practice in and through their actions at each 
point of the research process. The authors report that
Garfinkel is not asserting the impossibility of social science, 
but rather pointing to an alternative conception of what it 
consists in, one in which ‘social science practice’ is not 
determined by, or coextensive with, ‘rules of good procedure’. 
That is not to say ‘rules of good procedure’, i.e. methods, have 
no relevance in social science, but, rather, that they should not 
be treated as decontextualized descriptions of research practice 
– where one substitutes for the other. Instead, as we have tried 
to show, their relation to research practice is contingent, they 
are invoked and brought into play locally, ‘for all practical 
purposes’, by researchers in the course of what they do and as 
part of resolving the troubles they encounter along the way. 
(Greiffenhagen et al., 2015: 479)
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While Garfinkel may not have asserted the impossibility 
of social science, it should be noted that the authors cite a 
book in support of their argument, co-authored by one of 
them, whose title is There is No Such Thing as a Social 
Science (Hutchinson et al., 2008).7 Aside from this, it would 
seem to follow from what they write that methodological 
statements which are not directly involved in the activity of 
some ongoing research investigation must be viewed as 
superfluous, at best. Moreover, any methodological writings 
that are judged to be directly involved in the knowledge-
production process cannot be treated as providing general 
and/or prescriptive accounts but rather must be seen as 
glosses, produced on particular occasions for particular pur-
poses; they are to be viewed in terms of their functioning, not 
as sources of information or guidance.
I will not assess this argument in full here (see Hammersley, 
2018, 2019a), but focus solely on the fact that it leads to a 
performative contradiction. Methodography, as exemplified 
in the work of Greiffenhagen et al., claims to provide an 
account which accurately represents features of the work of 
the social scientists studied, ones which exist independently 
of that account and are quite general in character: that there 
is no sharp, fundamental difference in the reasoning of quali-
tative researchers and statisticians, and that what differences 
there are arise from the particular investigations in which 
these two sets of researchers are involved; that research prac-
tice does not amount simply to following rules; and so on. 
Yet, on their own argument, these conclusions must them-
selves be treated as superfluous, in the same manner as much 
methodology. They cannot even be viewed as glosses since 
they were certainly not produced as an integral part of the 
knowledge-production process in which the researchers 
studied were engaged; the authors were external observers 
who adopted a quite different perspective on that process 
from those directly involved in it.
This performative contradiction arises from applying the 
ethnomethodological argument that social processes reflex-
ively construct themselves as what they are to ethnometh-
odological work itself. Yet, if this is not done, we have a 
version of what Woolgar and Pawluch (1985) referred to as 
ontological gerrymandering. While those authors take this to 
be an existential inevitability to which the only genuine 
response is continually to acknowledge it, this is not the 
response of most ethnomethodologists; nor is it the stance 
adopted by Greiffenhagen et al. But, as a result, it is not clear 
what the ground on which their investigation could stand is.
The problem here stems from the very core of ethnometh-
odology – its insistence that language use is not a matter of 
conveying information about pre-existing phenomena, but 
rather is performative in character: language is used to do 
things rather than simply to make statements about them. 
However, it is necessary to point out that offering descrip-
tions, for various purposes, is one of the things that language 
can be used to do; indeed, it is what Greiffenhagen et al claim 
to be doing. A second source of the problem is that ethnometh-
odology proposes that the meaning of all utterances is treated 
as indexical: it is not a product of some set of rules operating 
on the basis of a dictionary of standard meanings; instead, 
ethnomethodologists treat meanings as constituted entirely in 
and through processes of social interaction on particular occa-
sions. This challenges any notion of language use as represen-
tation, in two respects. First, the referring process itself is not 
stable – there are no rules of translation whereby the meaning 
of a statement made at one time and place can be related to 
what the same statement (in lexical and grammatical terms) 
uttered on another occasion means. The relationship between 
the two meanings of the statement must be assumed to be 
undecidable, though it can of course always be formulated, in 
one way or another. The second challenge to representation is 
that there appears to be an ontology operating here whereby 
the existence of phenomena can be no more than their being 
constituted as meaningful objects on particular occasions dur-
ing the course of social interaction (see Zimmerman and 
Pollner, 1970). In other words, there is nothing ‘outside’ what 
we might call the social process of meaning constitution, just 
as for Derrida (1976) there could be ‘no outside to the text’ 
(pp. 158–159).8
We should note that this implies a fundamental difference 
in orientation between the authors and the researchers they 
studied. There are other likely differences in assumption too. 
For example, Greiffenhagen et al. (2015) declare that a key 
feature of ethnomethodology is ‘a steadfast refusal to privi-
lege sociological perspectives on the social world’ (p. 463). 
They report that
in treating ‘sociological reasoning’ as a ubiquitous feature of 
everyday life, Garfinkel was not seeking to elevate sociology to 
the status of a universal science but to undermine attempts to 
draw a demarcation line between sociological analyses and 
ordinary forms of practical reasoning by showing their ‘vulgar’ 
grounding. (Lynch, 2000; Sharrock, 2001)
By contrast, the researchers that the authors studied cannot 
avoid assuming that, through engaging in intensive investi-
gation based on specialised methods, they are capable of pro-
ducing answers to questions about the social world that are 
more likely to be true than those of lay people. If they were 
not to hold this assumption they could not apply for funding 
to do their work, or present their findings under the heading 
of social science, at least not with any integrity.9
What is involved here is not simply a disagreement between 
advocates of methodography and methodology, then, but one 
between ethnomethodologists and mainstream social scien-
tists. Furthermore, it is not a superficial disagreement, but 
approximates to what Lyotard (1984: 65–66) calls paralogy, a 
fundamental incommensurability (see Hammersley, 2019b). 
At best, conventional social research is viewed by ethnometh-
odologists as a form of practice that is self-constituting, not 
only in the sense of determining what counts as ‘good prac-
tice’ but also co-producing the very phenomena it documents. 
By contrast, it is clear even from the small amount of data that 
the authors cite that the researchers they studied believed that 
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they were aiming at accurate representations of phenomena 
that existed independently of their work.
There is a second problem with Greiffenhagen et al.’s 
work, which, at face value, is of a more mundane kind. This 
concerns its value: whether it produces worthwhile knowl-
edge. This is a question that all research must face; though, 
of course, there is considerable scope for disagreement about 
the value of any findings, and indeed about how worth is to 
be judged. Nevertheless, this is not simply an arbitrary mat-
ter: the fact that there may not be a consensus, or that there is 
no means of calculating value in a conclusive way, does not 
mean that any judgement is as good as any other. Judgements 
must be assessed on the basis of the grounds available to sup-
port them, with efforts made to traverse differences in view 
about the relative solidity of grounds. So, what follows 
below is my assessment of this research, and I indicate why I 
have come to the conclusions I have.
I suspect that, if mainstream social scientists read these arti-
cles, most of them would conclude that they do not offer much 
news. The response might be similar to audience reaction to a 
presentation given by the statisticians the authors studied:
The audience had been unwilling to engage with what made the 
research innovative in methodological terms because they were 
unable to identify any particularly visible substantive reward in 
doing so – they could not see what was in it for them. (Mair 
et al., 2016: 68)
As this quotation illustrates, a response tells us as much 
about the responder as it does about that to which they are 
responding. Nevertheless, I think there are some reasons for 
such a response in the case of the work I have been examin-
ing here. For instance, the fact that the qualitative-quantita-
tive distinction is a crude one that does not capture the 
details of actual practice is widely recognised, even in the 
methodological literature that the authors cite.10 And the 
claim that quantitative work relies on qualitative knowing is 
also far from new (see Campbell, 1978). Similarly, the fact 
that one cannot do good research by following a set of meth-
odological rules has long been acknowledged (see Bell and 
Newby, 1977).
But perhaps Greiffenhagen et al.’s work should be judged 
in terms of ethnomethodological news values, rather than 
those of mainstream social science?11 I am on even more 
uncertain ground here, but there seems to be a contrast 
between what these authors provide and what is characteris-
tic, say, of work in conversation analysis. The latter provides 
cumulative knowledge of interactional devices that people 
employ, and of how these function to deal with the various 
problems that can arise in social interaction. It is not clear to 
me that these articles offer much of this kind. Instead, like a 
great deal of other ethnomethodological work (Hammersley, 
2018: 81–84), the authors seem mainly to reiterate and illus-
trate pregiven assumptions of ethnomethodology.
For these reasons, my response to this body of work, albeit 
a very small-scale project, is one of disappointment. Careful, 
external investigation of the practices of social scientists and 
statisticians is a very promising venture. But, in my view, what 
would be required for this to be worthwhile is the description of 
those practices within the framework of a set of key methodo-
logical concerns – focusing, for instance, on how research 
questions are selected and formulated; how sources of data and 
methods are chosen, and on the basis of what considerations; 
what counts as evidence, how it is produced, what is treated as 
sufficient evidence; how the risk of speculative or biased inter-
pretations is guarded against; how any gap between the 
assumptions built into models and what happens in the contexts 
to which those models are intended to apply is to be reduced; 
and so on. As I have noted, the authors do address the relation-
ship between qualitative and quantitative approaches, but their 
discussion of this does not go much beyond what is already in 
the literature. Similarly, while they point to statisticians’ reli-
ance upon qualitative knowing they do not consider in detail 
just how even these statisticians acquired and deployed this 
type of knowledge.12
What I am recommending here does not undercut the dis-
tinction between methodography and methodology. The sorts 
of investigation I have just outlined could be solely concerned 
with what social scientists actually do, feeding very usefully 
into separate methodological discussion about the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of particular methods, correct-
ing and supplementing methodologists’ assumptions about 
social science practice. However, what I have proposed here 
is almost certainly at odds with an ethnomethodological ori-
entation, at least in its ‘radical’ forms (Lynch, 2016).
Conclusion
I have examined three articles reporting an ethnomethodo-
logical investigation of social scientific and statistical prac-
tice. In doing so, I raised some questions about this approach 
and its relationship to conventional social research and meth-
odology. While the authors present their work as simply 
describing the practices of the researchers they studied, they 
seem to promote this ‘methodography’ as displacing meth-
odology. I argued that, in important respects, they caricature 
the literature in that field, and that ethnomethodology does 
not provide a sound basis for methodography. This is because 
of an inherent performative contradiction: while insisting on 
the self-constituting character of any practice, including 
social science, the authors do not apply this to their own 
account of social science practices. Instead, this is offered as 
accurately representing general features that such practices 
possess independently of their investigation.
I also raised questions about the ‘news-value’ of these 
articles: I suggested that they do not tell us much new about 
social science practice. And, in my judgment, even how 
much news they offer in ethnomethodological terms is an 
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open question. Work in conversation analysis has produced a 
great deal of new knowledge about how talk-in-action is 
organised, but here the authors do not identify specific ana-
lytical devices that social scientists use. For the most part, 
their findings reiterate a common ethnomethodological 
theme: that rules cannot govern behaviour, so that work is 
involved in applying analytic methods, routine problems 
needing to be resolved. It seems to me that developing the 
field of investigation that these articles open up requires a 
rather different approach from that adopted in this body of 
work, one which abandons the radical claims of ethnometh-
odology and treats methodography as a supplement to 
methodology.
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Notes
 1. I have examined this more generally elsewhere, see 
Hammersley (2018: ch3).
 2. For further discussion, see Mair et al. (2013). See also 
Hammersley (1993a, 1993b).
 3. ‘Realities’ and ‘BIAS’ were the names of the two research teams.
 4. It is perhaps worth noting that ethnomethodology does not rule 
out self-documentation: see, for example, Robillard (1999) 
and Anderson and Sharrock (2018).
 5. Interestingly, this echoes a philosopher’s criticism of the phi-
losophy of science: Toulmin (1953). I am grateful to Michael 
Mair for reminding me of this.
 6. This is true with much of the rest of the literature on ‘the social 
life of methods’.
 7. For a response to this, see Hammersley (2017).
 8. Ethnomethodologists may deny this ontological commit-
ment, though I believe that they are on weak ground to do so 
(Hammersley, 2018, 2019a). Another option would be a meth-
odological interpretation; here, the idea that the social world 
is ongoingly constituted in and through processes of social 
interaction would be treated as a working hypothesis adopted 
to discover whether it opens up an interesting field of research 
possibilities. However, without ontological or epistemologi-
cal assumptions, or conclusions, the point of the investigation 
would be unclear and the status of any phenomena ‘discovered’ 
uncertain.
 9. Presumably, the attitude of ethnomethodology is that social 
science practices are available for descriptive study in the same 
manner as those of astrologers, water diviners, propagandists, 
and so on. Social scientists themselves cannot, of course, be so 
indifferent to the character and status of their work. And eth-
nomethodologists cannot legitimately ignore the question of 
the justification for their own investigations. In fact, it seems 
to me that the newsworthiness of the key ethnomethodological 
themes – that social scientists rely on common sense knowl-
edge and practices, that rules do not apply themselves, and so 
on – is entirely parasitic upon the existence of a conception of 
rationality which assumes that procedures can supplant prac-
tical judgement. While, as I pointed out earlier, much social 
science today does not rely on this conception of rationality, 
a great deal of policymaking within governments and large 
organisations arguably does. There is little sign, however, that 
ethnomethodology can serve as an effective corrective to this. 
Furthermore, ethnomethodologists’ contrast between this con-
ception of rationality and ‘ad hocing’ involves a false dichot-
omy, it tends to reinforce the fallacy that, if rules cannot be 
followed rigidly, what is good or bad judgement can only be a 
matter of what is given these labels.
10. The authors themselves refer to the mixed methods literature, 
where this view is widespread, but it is much more generally 
recognised.
11. Although it is worth noting that two out of the three journals 
in which the authors’ articles were published were not directed 
specifically at this field but at mainstream social scientists.
12. In my view, Mair et al. (2016) glorify this element of the 
statisticians’ work by applying the adjectives ‘ethnographic’, 
‘anthropological’ and ‘Geertzian’, thereby obscuring and 
neglecting the differences between how the statisticians and 
qualitative researchers go about ‘qualitative knowing’.
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